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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Is a defendant entitled to a jury trial under Utah Code Section 77-1-6 when the 
defendant fails to comply with Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
make a written demand for a jury trial? 
2. Issue: Was there enough evidence in support of the Appellant's reckless driving conviction 
and the Appellant's disorderly conduct conviction? 
3. Issue: Was the Appellant entitled to a Miranda warning when the Appellant was stopped 
for a routine traffic stop, and the threat made by the Appellant to the victim was not in 
response to any question but rather was a voluntary statement made by the Appellant? 
Standard of review: "This Court reviews a trial court's legal determinations 
non-deferentially for correctness." Salt Lake City v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66, 44 P.3d 835 (Ut. 
App. 2002). "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the trial 
court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Larsen, 
999 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Utah App. 2000)(quoting Spanish Fork v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501 (Utah App. 
1999)). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following ordinance and rules relevant to the determination of this matter are set forth 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-45 
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-102 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 17(d) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 21,2002, the appellant was charged with the offenses of Reckless Driving, 
a class B misdemeanor and Disorderly Conduct, a class C misdemeanor. The appellant arraigned 
on June 13, 2002, and the matter was set for a non-jury trial on My 19, 2002. Appellant was tried 
and convicted on July 19, 2002 of Reckless Driving, a class B misdemeanor and Disorderly 
Conduct, a class C misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The complaining witness and her mother were traveling on 800 South eastbound on their 
way to buy an ice cream, when the appellant pulled in off an intersecting side street. (Trial 
Transcript, hereinafter "Trial" p. 10, 20). The appellant slammed on his brakes and immediately 
pulled behind the women so close that the driver could see the faces of the male occupants in the 
appellant's vehicle. (Trial p. 10, 11). The appellant began flashing the lights on his vehicle and 
honking the horn. (Trial p. 11). The women were traveling at about 30 miles per hour which is 
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above the posted speed limit for 800 South. (Trial p. 12). 
The appellant was not satisfied with the women's speed, so the appellant attempted to pass 
the women on the left. (Trial p. 11). The appellant crossed a double yellow line into the oncoming 
traffic lane, but as the appellant's car got about halfway across the double line it was thwarted by 
an oncoming vehicle. (Trial p. 11). The appellant was still upset with the women's speed and 
continued to tailgate them, to flip them off, to flash his lights and honk the horn. (Trial p. 11). 
Next, the appellant attempted to pass the women on their right where there is no travel lane. (Trial 
p. 11). The appellant tailgated the women for about five to seven minutes. (Trial p. 14). 
At that point, the complaining witness made a complaint about the appellant's driving with 
Orem City Public Safety's dispatch, who instructed the complainant to follow the appellant's 
vehicle. (Trial p. 13). The appellant came to the intersection of State Street and 800 South and 
stopped at the green light. (Trial p. 12). The appellant could see the complaining witness speaking 
on her cell phone and did not want the women following him. (Trial p. 24). The appellant waited 
at the green light for it to turn yellow or red in an attempt to prevent her from following him, and 
then turned left at the very last moment. (Trial p. 12, 111). 
Officer Bingham stopped a vehicle matching the description and license plate number the 
complaining witness reported. (Trial p. 48). Officer Healy was dispatched to investigate the 
complaint and Officer Bingham stayed to assist. (Trial p. 48). The officers had the complaining 
witness stop behind them, so they could investigate their complaint. (Trial p. 48). Officer 
Bingham told the appellant the reason for the stop and asked for his license, registration, and proof 
of insurance. (Trial p. 49). The Appellant gave the officer a photocopy of his California driver's 
license. (Trial p. 49). As Officer Bingham ran standard computer checks on the appellant, he 
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observed the appellant arguing with Officer Healy. (Trial p. 51). Officer Bingham thought that 
there might be some trouble, so he stepped out of his vehicle to assist. (Trial p. 51). At that time, 
Officer Bingham asked the appellant again for his driver's license, which he produced out of his 
front pocket. (Trial p. 51). 
The appellant was asked to step to the back of the vehicle. (Trial p. 51). The appellant had 
to be asked three different times and the officer had to use stern language before the appellant 
would comply with the officer's request. (Trial p. 53). The officers began to speak with the 
complainant to get her side of what happened. (Trial p. 54). While the officers were speaking to 
the complainant their attention was not on the appellant and he took that opportunity to mouth the 
threat "you are going to pay," or words to that effect, to the women and flipped them off. (Trial p. 
13, 14). The women testified that they were afraid of the appellant and that it appeared that he was 
trying to memorize their license plate. (Trial p. 13). The women immediately told the officer that 
the appellant just threatened them and flipped them off. (Trial p. 54). 
Officer Healy asked the appellant if he said anything to the women. (Trial p. 54). The 
appellant again became belligerent toward the officer at which time the appellant was informed he 
was being placed under arrest. (Trial p. 55). The appellant was asked to turn around and placed 
his hands behind his back, but the appellant just blankly stared at the officer. (Trial p. 55). The 
appellant was blatantly non-compliant and belligerent. (Trial p. 55). Officer Bingham thought that 
the appellant was going to start a physical confrontation with the officers. (Trial p. 55). Appellant 
was arrested for Disorderly Conduct and Reckless Driving. (Trial p. 55). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant was not entitled to a jury trial because the appellant failed to make a written 
request for a jury trial within 10 days of the trial date. Appellant has failed to properly marshal the 
evidence, and has only presented those facts most favorable to appellant's position without 
citations to the record; therefore, the appellant waived his right to allege there was insufficient 
evidence to support his conviction. Alternatively, there was sufficient evidence on which to 
convict appellant of reckless driving and disorderly conduct. Additionally, appellant was not 
entitled to a Miranda warning as this was a brief, routine traffic stop, and the appellant voluntarily 
made a threat to the victim, appellant was not responding to any question of the officer when he 
made that threat. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 77-1-6 APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED 
TO A JURY TRIAL BECAUSE HE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 17(D) 
BY FAILING TO MAKE A WRITTEN DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL. 
In Salt Lake City v. Roseto, 44 P.3d 835 (Ut. App. 2002) this court stated that pursuant to 
Section 77-1-6 the trial court need only determine (1) that the defendant is charged with a crime 
other than an infraction; (2) that the defendant has complied with Rule 17(d) by making a written 
demand for a jury trial; and (3) that the defendant has not waived the right to a jury trial. Id. At 837. 
In Roseto, the defendant was charged with a class C misdemeanor, the defendant made a 
written demand for a jury trial, and she had not waived her right to a jury trial Therefore, she was 
entitled to a jury trial. In this case, the appellant was charged with a class B misdemeanor and a 
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class C misdemeanor. However, the appellant failed to comply with Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure by making a written demand for a jury trial. For failing to comply with 
Section 77-1-6 the appellant was not entitled to a jury trial in this case. 
The appellant argues that he was entitled to a jury trial by the language "or the court orders 
otherwise" of Rule 17(d). However, the lower court in this case never relieved the appellant of his 
obligation to comply with the written requirement of the Rule. The lower court expressed its 
opinion at arraignment that the appellant was not entitled to a jury trial, however, at the day of trial 
when the appellant brought up his right to a jury trial, the Court stated that no jury request had been 
made in the case: 
MR. BOVO: I was told that I was not to receive a jury. I was denied the 
right to a trial. 
THE COURT: Well, no one has ever requested a jury in this case. 
MR. BOVO: I did; I requested it. 
THE COURT: Okay, in order to request a jury you have to file a written 
demand at least 10 days before the trial date. And you haven't done that. 
MR. BOVO: Like I said, it's because I didn't realize there was a trial date. 
It's still a hearing. (Trial p. 8) 
Because the lower Court never stated that the appellant need not comply with the written 
requirement and because the appellant did not make a written request as required, the appellant was 
not entitled to a jury trial in this case. 
II. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND HAS, 
THEREBY, WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CLAIM THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO CONVICT HIM AT TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION. 
In making a claim of insufficiency of evidence to support the trial court's verdict, "the 
Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient 
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to support the findings against an attack." State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Utah App. 
1999)(quoting State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-476 (Utah 1990)). The burden on the 
defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is heavy. Larsen at 1255. Furthermore, the 
defendant's failure to properly marshal the evidence acts as a waiver of the insufficiency of 
evidence claim. See State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial, which supports the very findings the appellant resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 
818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id. "The gravity 
of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon 
the evidence is clearly erroneous." Id. 
Once the defendant has met the marshaling requirement, the Appellate court, reviewing a 
bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, will sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against 
the clear weight of the evidence. Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501, 502 (Utah App. 1999). 
In State v. Scheel 823 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Court refused to consider defendant's 
claim of insufficient evidence because defendant had failed to properly marshal the evidence. As 
in Scheel, Appellant's brief is "devoid of any mention of the evidence supporting the verdict." Id 
at 473. Rather, Appellant's brief argues legal conclusions of law and recounts testimony where 
there is a harmless discrepancy of one witness's testimony that he mouthed "you're going to pay" 
(Trial p. 14) vs. "You'll pay" (Trial p. 38). 
The appellant completely ignored the evidence that supports the trial court's verdict. The 
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appellant has failed to present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists and his brief is 
devoid of any mention of the evidence supporting the verdict. Rather, the Appellant's brief 
recounts a version of the facts most favorable to Appellant while ignoring the evidence that 
supports the trial court's verdict. Therefore, because the appellant has failed to properly marshal 
the evidence, the appellant has waived his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Accordingly, the City respectfully requests this Court decline to further address the Appellant's 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Assuming, arguendo, appellant has properly marshaled the evidence, the evidence is 
sufficient to sustain the trial courts conviction. The evidence at trial showed that the complaining 
witness and her mother were traveling on 800 South eastbound intending to go buy an ice cream, 
when the appellant pulled in off an intersecting side street. The appellant slammed on his brakes 
and began tailgating the women. Next, he began flashing the lights on his vehicle and honking the 
horn. Then, part of the appellant's vehicle crossed a double yellow line into oncoming traffic in an 
attempt to pass the women, but was thwarted by an oncoming vehicle. Then, the appellant 
attempted to pass the women on the right where there is no travel lane. During this period of travel 
a male occupant in the vehicle flipped the women off. She responded by flipping him off. 
At that point, the complaining witness got on the phone with dispatch, and dispatch 
instructed her to follow the vehicle. The appellant came to the intersection of State Street and 800 
South. The appellant stopped at the green light and waited for the light to turn yellow or red in an 
apparent attempt to prevent her from following him, and then turned at the very last moment. 
This evidence supports the appellant's conviction of reckless driving under Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 41-6-45 in that it shows the appellant acted in a manner with willful or wanton disregard for the 
safety of persons or property, and that the appellant committed more than three driving offenses in 
a single episode to whit: following too close, attempting to pass over a double yellow line, 
attempting to pass on the right where there is no lane of travel, and impeding traffic at a green 
traffic light. 
During the traffic stop, both the complaining witness and her mother, eyewitnesses, 
testified that the appellant faced towards them when the officer's back was turned to him and he 
mouthed words to the effect of "you're going to pay," and flipped them off. During the traffic stop, 
the officers had to ask the appellant more than once to comply with fairly simple commands, like 
producing his driver's license, moving to the back of the vehicle, turning around, etc. Furthermore, 
the appellant was belligerent to the officers and there were several times when Officer Bingham 
thought the appellant was going escalate the stop into a physical encounter. 
This evidence is sufficient to support the trial courts finding that the appellant committed 
the crime of disorderly conduct under Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 in that the appellant created a 
physically offensive condition when he threatened the complaining witnesses, flipped them off, 
was belligerent to the officers, and was noncompliant with simple orders from the officers. 
Furthermore, the appellant engaged in threatening behavior when he threatened the complaining 
witness and flipped them off. Additionally, the appellant engaged in threatening behavior when he 
was repeatedly belligerent to the officers, was repeatedly noncompliant, and when the officer 
repeatedly felt that the appellant was going to escalate the situation to a physical altercation. 
Therefore, the City respectfully requests this Court to sustain the Appellant's convictions of 
Reckless Driving and Disorderly Conduct. 
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III. APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A MIRANDA WARNING BECAUSE 
HE WAS TEMPORARILY DETAINED PURSUANT TO A TRAFFIC STOP 
AND WAS NOT IN CUSTODY. 
Appellant's Miranda argument is without merit. The United States Supreme Court stated 
in Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9 (1988) that persons temporarily detained pursuant to a traffic 
stop are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda and are not entitled to a Miranda warning. Id. 
at 10. See also, Berkemer v. McCartv, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). The Court concluded that this was 
because traffic stops are brief and often occur in the public view. Id. In this case, Appellant was 
stopped to investigate a traffic violation of reckless driving. This traffic stop was brief and 
occurred in the public view. Therefore, Appellant was not entitled to a Miranda warning during the 
traffic stop. 
Furthermore, the appellant voluntarily made the threat "you're going to pay" to the victims. 
This threat was not in response to any question by either officer. A Miranda warning is only 
required when the appellant is in police custody and that appellant is being interrogated. State v. 
Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 355 (Utah App. 1993). Additionally, the appellant waived his right to 
challenge this statement under Miranda as the appellant failed to object to its admission during 
trial. 
IV. THE APPELLANT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY AND DRIVING 
RECORD ARE IRRELEVANT AND IMPROPER CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
UNDER UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 403 AND RULE 404. 
The following exchange occurred during the trial when the appellant attempted to testify of 
his prior history: 
MR. BOVO: Your Honor, on the day of April 6th, 2002, at approximately 
18:50,1 was driving. I turned left on 800 South. As my criminal and my driving 
record both show -
MS. JENSEN: Objection. 
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THE COURT: Sustained. That's not relevant. What your driving record 
and criminal history are aren't relevant for the purposes of a verdict in this case. 
(Trial p. 90). The appellant's driving record and criminal history are irrelevant under Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 403 and improper character evidence under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404. 
Therefore, it was proper for the trial court to exclude this information. 
V. THE APPELLANT RECEIVED A FAIR TRIAL AND HIS ARGUMENT THAT 
THE JUDGE WAS BIASED HAS NO MERIT. 
The appellant's argument that the judge was biased and allowed the prosecutor to object at 
will is unfounded. At trial the appellant asked the same question multiple times, testified rather 
than ask a question of the witness, repeatedly referred to facts not in evidence such as police reports, 
and repeatedly tried to introduce hearsay testimony. The Judge explained the reason these things 
were not allowed. The appellant repeatedly ignored the instruction and continued his line of 
questioning in this manner, which was improper and objected to by the prosecutor. 
The passage the appellant quotes as evidence of this bias was misquoted. The passage in 
the Trial transcript reads: 
Q. [BY MR. BOVO] Did you see any other units pass by the scene? 
A. [O. BINGHAM] It is possible that other units drove by. However, they 
did not stop. That's of no consequence. 
Q. Did you see other units pass by? 
MS JENSEN: Objection 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
(Trial p. 64). This was a proper objection to a question already asked and answered that the Judge 
properly sustained. 
Q. (BY MR. BOVO) Have you ever fabricated information to -
MS. JENSEN: Objection 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
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(Trial p. 64). This was also a proper objection to a question asking about improper character 
evidence under Utah Rules 402, 403, and 404 because the appellant had no good faith basis that 
officer had ever fabricated information, the question was not relevant, and it was not more 
probative than prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant waived his right to a jury trial when the appellant failed to make a written 
demand for a jury trial 10 days before trial in this matter. The appellant has failed to properly 
marshal the evidence and therefore waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 
In the alternative, if this court excuses the appellant's failure to marshal the evidence, the evidence 
at trial was sufficient to support the appellant's conviction of reckless driving and disorderly 
conduct. Additionally, the appellant was not entitled to a Miranda warning because the appellant 
was stopped during a routine traffic stop, and the threat the appellant made was voluntary and not 
in response to any question posed by an officer. The City respectfully request the trial courts ruling 
be affirmed and the Appellant's brief be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of March, 2003. 
wt 
Robert J. Church 
Orem City Prosecutor 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, 
postage prepaid, this 4th day of March, 2003, to the following: 
TODD BOVO, 
Defendant Pro Se 
300 West 745 South 
Orem, UT 84058 
Telephone: (801) 427-2717 
Robert J. Church 
Orem City Prosecutor 
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Service: Get by LEXSTAT® 
TOC: Utah Code Annotated > / . . . / > ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
> § 41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty 
Citation: utah code section 41-6-45 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
* * * STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 6TH SPECIAL SESSION * * * 
* * * ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2002 UT 111, 2002 UT APP 384 * * * 
* * * AND NOVEMBER 15, 2002 (FEDERAL CASES) * * * 
TITLE 4 1 . MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
• GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (2003) 
§ 41-6-45. Reckless driving — Penalty 
(1) A person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle: 
(a) in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property; or 
(b) while committing three or more moving traffic violations under Title 4 1 , Chapter 6, 
Traffic Rules and Regulations, in a series of acts within a single continuous period of driving. 
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
HISTORY: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 35; C. 1943, 57-7-112; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 9; 1986, ch. 178, § 
30; 1987, ch. 138, § 44; 1987, ch. 204, § 1 ; 2000, ch. 25, § 2. 
NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. - T h e 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added Subsection (1) 
(b), deleted graduated sentencing requirements for first and second or subsequent 
convictions of reckless driving in Subsection (2), and made related changes. 
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Jurisdict ion of juvenile court, §§ 78-3a-104, 78-3a-601. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
FORMER JEOPARDY. 
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving did not bar a subsequent prosecution for 
involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey, 65 Utah 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A.L.R. 558 (1925). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AM. JUR. 2D. - 7 A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 373 et seq. 
Service Get by LEXSTAT® 
TOC Utah Code Annotated > / / > PART 1 BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND RELATED OFFENSES > § 76-
9-102. Disorderly conduct 
Citation utah code section 76-9-102 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
* * * STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 6TH SPECIAL SESSION * * * 
* * * ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2002 UT 111, 2002 UT APP 384 * * * 
* * * AND NOVEMBER 15, 2002 (FEDERAL CASES) * * * 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 9. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER AND DECENCY 
PART 1. BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND RELATED OFFENSES 
• GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (2003) 
§ 76-9-102. Disorderly conduct 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move from a public place, or 
knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any act which serves no 
legitimate purpose; or 
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a 
risk thereof, he: 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior; 
(n) makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
(in) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard in a public place; 
or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to which the public or a 
substantial group of the public has access and includes but is not limited to streets, 
highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, 
transport facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues after a request by a 
person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-9-102, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-9-102; 1999, ch. 20, § 1. 
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TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (2003) 
§ 77-1-6. Rights of defendant 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entit led: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against h im; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is 
alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial 
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court 
permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs 
of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 17 
^ ^ K | i n g regarding the charges if the provisions of Subsec-
H f f i ) are observed, in addition to the following provisions 
^ H f e h e recording is both visual and aural and recorded on 
^ H m videotape or by other electronic means, 
^ H & h e recordmg equipment is capable of making an accu-
^ H p c o r d i n g , the operator is competent, and the recording is 
^ H p i t e and is not altered, 
^ H & e a c h voice on the recording is identified, and 
^ H f f each party is given an opportunity to view the recording 
^ K f e rt 1S s n o w n i n the courtroom 
H If the court orders tha t the testimony of a child be taken 
K f Subsection (2) or (3), the child ma\ not be required to 
•litify in court at any proceeding where the recorded testi 
Ilffile 16* Discovery. 
f 5a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall dis 
f jcloee to the defense upon request the following material or 
fejn&rmation of which he has knowledge 
F M) relevant written or recorded statements of the defen-
l dant or codefendants, 
I (2) the criminal record of the defendant, 
f ~ (3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefen 
dant, 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or 
i mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment, and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines 
on good cause shown should be made available to the defen-
dant m order for the defendant to adequately prepare his 
defense 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as 
practicable following the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead The prosecutor has a continu-
ing duty to make disclosure 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the de-
fense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as 
required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other 
item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for 
the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case 
j(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall 
make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as 
practicable He has a continuing duty to make disclosure 
He) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor 
ornlefense may make disclosure by notifying the opposing 
party that material and information may be mspected, tested 
or copied at specified reasonable times and places The pros-
ecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the 
further dissemination of sensitive mformation otherwise sub-
ject to discovery to prevent improper use of the mformation or 
to protect victims and witnesses from harassment, abuse or 
undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the further 
dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psy-
chological or medical reports 
*(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time 
order that discovery or mspection be denied, restricted, or 
deferred, tha t limitations on the further dissemination of 
discovery be modified or make such other order as is appro-
priate Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the par ty 
to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a 
*ntten statement to be inspected by the judge alone If the 
oourt enters an order granting relief following such an ex 
Parte showing, the entire text of the party's s tatement shall be 
*£fcled and preserved in the records of the court to be made 
mailable to the appellate court in the event of an appeal 
J)tg) If a t any time during the course of the proceedings it is 
"fought to the attention of the court tha t a party has failed to 
comply with this rule, the court may order such party to 
permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or 
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems jus t under the 
circumstances 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may 
be required to 
(1) appear in a lmeup, 
(2) speak for identification, 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bod]ly 
impressions, 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the 
crime, 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise, 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail 
scrapings, and other bodily materials which can be obtain sd 
without unreasonable intrusion, 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting, 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of 
his body, and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appear-
ance al the time of the alleged offense 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is re-
quired for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the 
time and place of such appearance shall be given to the 
accused and his counsel Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved oy 
order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds 
for revocation of pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence 
m the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with 
other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be 
subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem 
appropriate 
Ru le 17. T h e t r i a l . 
(a) In all cases the defendant shah have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel The defendant shall be 
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defen-
dant may consent in writing to trial m his absence, 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the 
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to 
defendant of the t ime for trial shall not prevent the case from 
bemg tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall 
have the same effect as if defendant had been present, and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from tna l 
for good cause shown which may mclude tumultuous, riotous, 
or obstreperous conduct 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require 
the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried m the 
following order 
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is m custody, 
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody, 
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance, 
and 
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recog-
nizance 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defen-
dant waives a jury m open court with the approval of the court 
and the consent of the prosecution 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the 
defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to 
trial, or the court orders otherwise No jury shall be allowed in 
the trial of an infraction 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall 
be as specified m Section 78-46-5, U C A. 1953 
